At the Same Table, but Not with Equal Power

Consider a group of eight or ten organizations coming together to develop a joint initiative. Their first meetings are marked by enthusiasm, optimism, and assurances that everyone wants the same outcome. Gradually, however, it becomes apparent that some participants speak to one another more frequently, have access to more information, coordinate their positions before joint meetings, and arrive with proposals they have already developed together. Without any formal change in the group's composition, an informal hierarchy of influence begins to emerge. The stronger participants gain the ability to determine which issues will be discussed, which options are considered realistic, and how quickly decisions should be made. The weaker participants remain involved, but increasingly feel that their role is limited to accepting or challenging choices that have already taken shape. They have not been formally excluded from the process, yet they begin to doubt whether they can influence it in any meaningful way.

At this point, a particularly dangerous shift can occur. Negotiation begins to move away from the search for shared solutions and towards a contest for influence. Smaller participants may conclude that they must join forces against the stronger ones. The stronger parties, in turn, may interpret this mobilization as an attempt to obstruct an initiative in which they have invested more resources. New alliances emerge, discussions move outside the common negotiating table, and proposals are judged not only by their substance but also by who puts them forward. A useful idea may be rejected because it comes from a rival group, while a less effective option may attract support simply because it strengthens an alliance's influence. The joint project remains the official objective, but the real priority has shifted towards preserving or improving each party's position. People who came together to pursue the same idea may ultimately end up competing within the very same project, wasting resources, time, and opportunities for cooperation.

But is confrontation really the best option for a weaker participant? Not necessarily. Constantly measuring one's strength against that of a larger player can trap a party in a negotiation it is unlikely to win. It may have limited financial resources, a smaller network of influence, or very little ability to shape the final decisions. None of this means that its participation lacks value. The more useful question is what it can offer that genuinely matters to the stronger parties. It may possess specialist knowledge, access to a local market, the trust of particular social or professional groups, or the capacity to undertake an activity that larger participants cannot carry out as effectively. A smaller player does not always need to prove that it is equally powerful. It may need to demonstrate why working with it creates value that the others cannot easily secure on their own. Recognizing unequal power can therefore shift the discussion away from who is stronger and towards why cooperation is worth pursuing.

Of course, interests are not always complementary. Sometimes they genuinely conflict. Two participants may be competing for the same scarce resource, control over an activity, or a right that cannot be granted to both at once. In such circumstances, cooperation cannot be secured through polite language or broad appeals to a shared objective. A weaker player must assess its options realistically. Can it genuinely confront a much stronger counterpart effectively? Does it have alternatives that would allow it to reject an unfavorable agreement? Can it form an alliance with others whose interests are genuinely aligned? And if such an alliance is formed, how stable will it remain if stronger players offer different benefits to individual members? Forming a group does not automatically create cohesion or negotiating power. The group itself must reach agreement on its objectives, priorities, and limits of concession. Otherwise, an alliance may dissolve at the first serious test.

What is particularly interesting, however, is that many conflicts appear impossible to resolve because everyone is demanding something at the same time. This points to an often-overlooked possibility: not every interest needs to be satisfied simultaneously. A solution may lie in the way benefits, responsibilities, and opportunities to participate are distributed over time. A major investor may need an immediate start and a rapid return, while a smaller partner may care primarily about long-term access to an activity. One organization may consider it essential to retain control during the initial implementation, while another may be more interested in participating in later stages. If every party insists on securing everything in the present, conflict may be unavoidable. But if the parties consider a different sequence of steps, the gradual assumption of responsibilities, or benefits granted subject to clear conditions, new room for agreement may emerge.

This does not mean that the weaker party should accept a loss today in exchange for a vague promise of future gains. On the contrary, the greater the imbalance of power, the more important the credibility of commitments becomes. Future participation needs to be tied to clear terms, specific milestones, verifiable conditions, and provisions for situations in which the original agreements are not honored. Otherwise, distributing benefits over time can become a way of postponing the claims of weaker participants without offering them any meaningful protection. The strategic value of this approach is not that it pushes conflict into the future, but that it recognizes how different interests may matter at different stages of a partnership. When we cannot agree on who should benefit most today, it may be worth exploring how credible benefits can be created for more participants at different points in time.

Who, though, can bring these possibilities to light once participants have become entrenched in their disputes? When each party believes that any concession will strengthen an opponent, and when stronger players struggle to distinguish the concerns of smaller participants from an intention to obstruct the project? Under these conditions, an independent third party with expertise in negotiation and the strategic coordination of complex collaborations can meaningfully change the dynamic. Not because this person holds more authority than the participants or can impose a solution, but because they can take on a task that none of the parties can easily perform without being questioned: organizing the negotiation process independently of competing interests and re-establishing the conditions for meaningful communication.

This role requires far more than chairing meetings or maintaining a polite atmosphere. An independent negotiator must first understand the group's actual structure. Who has formal decision-making authority? Who exercises real influence without holding an official position? Which alliances already exist, and which dependencies have not yet been recognized? The negotiator must identify which interests are genuinely in conflict and which only appear to be because the parties have not considered other options. They may speak separately with participants, within an agreed framework of confidentiality, to understand whether a public refusal is a final position or whether it conceals a need for a guarantee, recognition, or a different allocation of responsibility. This knowledge does not entitle the negotiator to pass confidential information from one party to another. It does, however, enable them to frame neutral questions and develop alternative proposals that help the parties reconsider their options.

Of particular importance is the ability to act as a buffer against conflict. In an already strained collaboration, even a useful observation may be perceived as an attack simply because it comes from a particular participant. An independent third party can redirect the discussion from personalities to the actual issues without distorting the substance of the disagreement. If a smaller organization says it is being excluded from decisions, the task is to identify which decisions affect it, what degree of participation it is entitled to, and what information it needs to fulfil its obligations. If a stronger participant believes that smaller partners are delaying the project without justification, the task is to examine which procedures cause those delays and whether they can be simplified without undermining substantive rights. In this way, a broad confrontation can be translated into specific matters that are open to negotiation.

Equally important is preventing the emergence of separate and competing centers of information. When each subgroup develops its own version of reality, participants struggle to agree even on the facts that should inform their decisions. An independent third party can organize a shared process for assessing information, help establish objective criteria, and develop a common working framework that records the available options, areas of agreement, and outstanding issues. Participants then no longer need to defend separate proposals as symbols of their own power. Instead, they can jointly examine a framework that evolves over time, recognizing which elements have already been accepted and where genuine differences remain.

In this process, neutrality does not mean treating every demand as equally justified or ignoring the actual distribution of power. It means ensuring that professional judgment does not depend on any one party's desire to prevail. An independent negotiator can acknowledge that a major investor makes a greater financial contribution and may reasonably seek specific guarantees, without assuming that this gives the investor the right to disregard every other interest. Equally, the negotiator can recognize that a smaller organization has limited bargaining influence without promising authority it does not possess. Meaningful equality of standing lies in the quality and credibility of the process, not in artificially equalizing the participants' power. The third party's independence must also be demonstrated in practice through clear rules, a transparent mandate, and consistent treatment of everyone involved.

Perhaps most importantly, an independent negotiator can help the group change the question it is trying to answer. When the discussion has narrowed to who will prevail, the available choices inevitably seem limited. But when the parties begin asking who needs what, at which point in time, at what cost, and under what guarantees, possibilities for cooperation may emerge that were previously overlooked. This does not guarantee that agreement will be reached. Some interests may genuinely be incompatible, and some participants may have no compelling reason to continue. A credible negotiation process must be capable of recognizing that reality too. Success does not mean securing an agreement at any cost. It means finding a workable solution where genuine room for cooperation exists.

Ultimately, multiparty negotiations do not require us to pursue an equality of power that does not exist. They require us to understand real influence, visible and invisible relationships, alliances, interdependencies, and the opportunities that arise when different participants choose to work together. Negotiation does not become more effective when we ignore inequalities. It becomes more effective when we account for them in designing a process that allows every necessary party to recognize genuine value in participating. Sometimes this requires stronger players to understand that the ability to impose a decision does not always ensure successful implementation. At other times, it requires weaker players to move beyond an unproductive comparison of strength and identify the interests through which they can create meaningful negotiating value.

We do not need equal power in order to negotiate. We need to recognize the actual strength of each participant, while remembering that cooperation becomes meaningful only when it creates value that the parties cannot obtain on their own, or cannot obtain as effectively.

Perhaps, then, real success in a complex multiparty negotiation is neither the victory of the strongest alliance nor the equalization of everyone's interests. It is the creation of a partnership in which different strengths complement one another rather than cancel each other out. And when the parties themselves can no longer organize that process without reproducing their conflicts, the involvement of an independent third party may be the strategic choice that allows their joint effort to move forward.